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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - -
GUSTAVE E. BUSH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICKEY M. COULT, et al, 
Defendants. 
THE LOCKHART COMPANY, 
vs. 
Third Party 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* Third Party 
Defendant and * 
Appellant. 
* 
CASE NO. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
15680 
The Third Party Defendant, Commonwealth Land Title Insu-
ranee Compan~ is a corporation engaged in the general business 
of title insurance in the State of Utah, and will be referred 
to hereinafter as "Appellant". The Third Party Plaintiff, The 
Lockhart Company, is a corporation licensed as an industrial 
loan company under the laws of the State of Utah and will be 
referred to hereinafter as "Respondent". 
"TR" refers to the Transcript of the Record, "R" refers 
to the Record, and "Ex" refers to Exhibit. 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case the plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush, filed suit 
against various defendants to quiet title to a parcel of land 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, contending that the interests 
asserted by each defendant were derived by a forged deed of 
conveyance. (R 2) 
One of the defendants, in the original Complaint, The 
Lockhart Company, filed a Cross Claim against the other defen-
dants, alleging that said defendants had executed and delivered 
to The Lockhart Company, Promissory Notes secured by Deeds of 
Trust (Ex. P 1, 2, 3, 4) upon the land which is the subject of 
this action, and further contending that said notes were in 
default and that Judgment should be entered in favor of The 
Lockhart Company for the sums evidenced by said Notes and 
that said Deeds of Trust should be foreclosed as a mortgage. 
(R 6-21) 
Thereafter, Respondent filed a Third Party Complaint in 
two counts against the Appellant. The first count alleges that 
Appellant is liable to Respondent for losses incurred due to 
defects in the title of the real property given as security for 
the Promissory Notes aforesaid, and based upon policies of 
title insurance issued by Appellant in favor of Respondent. The 
second count alleges damages for attorney's fees, costs and 
failure to undertake the defe~se of the action instituted by 
Plaintiff, and fo;~ punitive dar::ages incurred by reason of the 
Appellant's fa:;_lure to defend the accion instituted bv the 
plaintiff. (R 22-32) 
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Appellant answered the third party Complaint of Respon-
dent and asserted various defenses. (R 67-71). In brief, 
Appellant asserted that Respondent had a duty to seek recovery 
of its loss, if any, against the makers of the original Promissory 
Notes and Deeds of Trust, and further, that Appellant was not 
liable for any loss or damage, or the defense of said action 
by ·virtue of the fact that the loss or damage, if any, sustained 
by Respondent was excluded from coverage under the "Exclusions 
From Coverage" provisions of the applicable Cotmnitment for 
Insurance and the policies of title insurance. (Ex. P-5, P-6, P-7) 
Following discovery, the plaintiff, Gustave Bush, filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment ag~t the original defendants, 
which motion was granted, quieting title in the plaintiff. 
The Respondent then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
against the defendants Coult and Harward, and a similar Motion 
against the Appellant. (R. 135). The later Motion was opposed 
by the Appellant. (R. 163-165). On May 17, 1977 the Motion for 
Summary Judgment in favor of The Lockhart Company and against 
the defendants Coult and H~rward was granted. (R 176-177). 
The issues exisiting between Appellant and Respondent 
were set down for trial after Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judg1Ilent had been denied. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the conclusion of two days of trial, the Court, sitting 
without a jury, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding, entered 
Judgment in favor of the Respondent and against the Appellant 
and made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
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and Judgment. (R 217-224). Appellant filed a Motion for 
New Trial, Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment (R 228-233), which were overruled and denied. 
(R 235-237). Thereafter, Notice of Appeal was filed. (R 238). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the Judgment and ruling of the trial 
court be reversed, and that Judgment be entered in favor of 
Appellant and against the Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times material to this action, the Respondent 
corporation, The Lockhart Company, maintained a branch office 
at Provo, Utah, and employed as its manager an individual by the 
name of Gary Lyon. (TR 74-7Y). Mr. Lyon had been employed by 
the Respondent in a managerial capacity for some 13 years, and 
he was well versed and acquainted with mortgage loan transactions, 
(TR 74-75). During May, 1975, he was contacted by one Leon 
Harward, who stated that he had been requested to assist in the 
procurement of a mortgage loan for a party by the name of Jerome 1 
Yeck, who desired to use the money for development of a 
subdivision in Salt Lake County, Utah, and that a first mort-
gage on said property would be given as security by Mr. Yeck. 
(TR 76, 77, 79). 
In the course of this initial contact, Mr. Lyon was 
informed that the loan was to be used for developing a portion 
of said tract of land which would contain in excess of 100 homes. 
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and that Holmquist & Sons Realtors would do the selling of the 
homes in the project. (TR 76, 77, 92, 101) Mr. Lyon testified 
that he "understood" that Mr. Yeck had fee title to the pro-
perty in question and that the property comprised 126 acres of 
real property in West Jordan, Utah. (TR 82) Mickey Coult and 
Leon Harward were real estate agents employed by Holmquist & 
Sons Realtors. (TR 118-119) 
At this time Mr. Lyon obtained a financial statement and 
"resume" on Mr. Yeck as well as an "updated" credit report. (TR 
76-78) (Ex. D-15, D-16, D-17) 
After said reports had been obtained, Mr. Lyon conclu-
ded that the Respondent would not be interested in making a loan 
to Mr. Yeck and so advised the real estate agent, Mr. Harward. 
(TR 80-81) 
After the loan application for Mr. Yeck had been declined 
hy the Respondent, Leon Harward once against contacted Mr. Lyon 
and asked "if we restructure the situation and put it (referring 
to the title) in a fee title or take the property into somebody 
else's name" could the loan be obtained. (TR 82, 83) To this 
inquiry Mr. Lyon stated that such could be accomplished, how-
ever it would require two separate loans of $25,000.00 each, 
with one loan to be made in favor or Mickey Coult and the other 
to Merrill Harward, father of Leon Harward. (TR 82,83) 
Mr. Lyon was then informed by Mr. Harward and Mr. Coult 
that they were in possession of an unrecorded deed to the 
subject property, signed by Gustave E. Bush, in favor of Deseret 
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Distributing Company, (a corporation in which Jerome Yeck was 
involved). (TR 83) Pursuant to instructions from Mr. Lyon, 
Leon Harward and Mickey Coult then delivered said deed to 
Western States Title Insurance Company for the purpose of 
obtaining a title policy or committment for title insurance. 
(TR 83) It shoutd be noted that the Respondent transacted 
a vast maj~rity of it's title insurance business with Western 
States Title Insurance Company at all times material to this 
action, and had transacted a great deal of business with them 
in the past. (TR 87) 
Shortly after the delivery of said deed to Western 
States Title Insurance Company, Mr. Lou Livingston, chief 
administrative officer and counsel for Western States Title 
Insurance Company, telephoned Mr. Lyon and informed him that 
said deed had been "checked" and that the investigation 
revealed that Deseret Distributing Company, was a corporation 
not in good standing, that Mr. Yeck was a director of the 
corporation, and the Western States Title Insurance Company did 
not care to have any business transactions where Mr. Yeck was 
involved in any way. (TR 84, TR 33, Vol. II) 
Mr. Lyon then informed Mr. Harward that Western States 
Title Insurance Company would not write the title insurance, 
however, Respondent would accept a title policy from another 
title insurance company if one could be obtained. (TR 85, 86) 
Subsequently, Mr. Coult delivered to Mr. Lyon a preliminary 
title report issued by Appellant. (TR 86, Ex. P-5) 
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Mr. Coult then took the original deed in favor of 
Deseret Distributing Company back to Jerome Yeck and requested 
that he obtain a new deed from Mr. Bush to Mr. Coult. (TR 124) 
After this was accomplished, in mid June, 1975, the 
Respondent consummated two separate loans with the defendants 
Mickey Coult and Patricia Ann C~ult, his wife, and Merrill W. 
Harward and Vera Mae Harward, his wife, each in the amount of 
approximately $25,000.00 and obtained Promissory Notes and 
Deeds of Trust on the subject property. (TR 97, 98) (Ex. P-1, 
2, 3, & 4) 
In the course of all these transactions, Mr. Lyon, 
manager for Responden~ had been informed that Mr. Yeck and/or 
a corporation controlled by Mr. Yeck (Deseret Distributing 
Company) claimed to be an owner or possess an interest in the 
real property which is the subject of this action; (TR 76, 77, 
79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 89) that plans existed for the development 
and sale of said property; (TR 92, 102, 108) that Jerome Yeck 
held an "option" or right to demand a reconveyance of the 
title upon repayment of the obligations in favor of Respondent 
(Ex. P-1, 2, 3, & 4) and that Mr. Yeck had agreed to repay 
the loans in favor of Respondent. (TR 134, 135) 
At no time did Respondent furnish Appellant any written 
notice of the claimed interest of Jerome Yeck or of "his 
company" or of the existance of the deed of conveyance in favor 
of Deseret Distributing Company, or that Western States Title 
Insurance Company had refused to issue title insurance upon 
the property because of Mr. Yeck's involvement, nor did said 
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Appellant possess any such knowledge or information prior to 
the date that Summons and Complaint were served upon Respondent 
in this action. (TR 88, 89, 90, 91) 
l 
The Appellant and several other title insurance companies 
subscribed to a service generally identified as Dina-Comp, Inc., 
a "computerized title plant" which supplied computerized 
abstracts of title and Judgment records pertaining to real 
esta.te in Salt Lake County, Utah, during the times material to 
this action. (TR 66-67) 
On about April 12, 1974, Dina-Comp, Inc., made an entry 
in the "general index" furnished to the members of it's service 
that they should be alerted to the name of Jerome Yeck with a 
notation that Utah Title Insurance Company should be contacted 
for further information. (TR 67-69) This precautionary action 
occurred as a result of Utah Title Insurance Company sustaining 
a loss of approximately $45,000.00 in 1973-1974 due to a "forged 
deed" where Jerome Yeck was identified as the responsible party 
for the forgery. (TR Vol. II, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10) 
Approximately 5-6 years prior to the trial of this case, 
Western States Title Insurance Company insured title to a 
parcel of real estate in Salt Lake County, Utah, and as a result 
of a "forged deed", admitted to by Mr. Yeck, was required to 
respond to a claim by it's insured. This information was cir-
culated widely among members of the title insurance industry, 
including Appellant. (TR Vol. II, 33, 36) 
Many title insurance companies '"ere alerted to the name 
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of Jerome Yeck and precautions were instituted to be aware of 
any request for title insurance where said party was involved 
in any manner. (TR Vol. II, 8, 10, 11-20, 23-26, 33-35, 61-71) 
Some time after the loans to the defendants Mr. Coult and 
Mr. Harward had been consummated, the plaintiff, Gustave E. Bush, 
filed a Complaint on November 12, 1975 against Mr. Coult, Mr. 
Harward and The Lockhart Company seeking to quiet title tQ 
the subject property. (R 2) 
After suit had been filed, and the Respondent served with 
process, Mr. Gary Lyon placed a telephone call to the office 
of Appellant and related to an employee of Appellant that the 
Respondent had been served with Summons and Complaint in this 
action and inquired what should be done. He was advised to 
contact counsel. (TR 38, 44) During the course of'this conver-
sation, it was related to the employee, by Mr. Lyo~ that they 
had normally done all of their title insurance business with 
Western States Title Insurance Company and that they had ori-
ginally tried to get title insurance from Western States Title 
Insurance Company on this property, however, it was refused 
because Jerome Yeck was involved and he had"burned them before". 
(TR 38) 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGME~T ARE ERRONEOUS 
ARGUMENT 
Finding of Fact No. 10 (R 219) presents a gross dis-
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tortion of the credible probative evidence and testimony. This 
Finding should be read in conjunction with Finding of Fact No. 
9 to understand it's full significance. These findings are as 
follows: 
"9. In this proceeding the Court has taken judicial 
notice of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment 
entered by this Court in the present action (Civil No. 231575) 
in favor of Gustave E. Bush, plaintiff and against the defen-
dants named therein, (Mickey M. Coult, Patricia Ann Coult, 
Merrill Wilson Harward, Vera Mae Harward and The Lockhart 
Company) wherein it was held that Gustave E. Bush is the 
owner in fee simple of the property described above and that 
he has never executed any deed or document conveying any 
interest in the above described real property to any of the 
defendants named therein and that any purported conveyance 
from himself to the defendants Mickey M. Coult and Patricia 
Ann Coult does not contain the signature of Gustave E. Bush. 
Neither the Third Party Plaintiff nor the Third Party Defen-
dant opposed Bush's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
10. The Third Party Plaintiff, The Lockhart Company, 
had no knowledge of the above referenced defect and had no 
knowledge of any other defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse 
claim or other matter effecting the title to the property 
described above." 
The committment for title insurance (Ex. P-5) and the 
two policies of title insurance which are at issue here (Ex. 
P-6, P-7) each contain the following significant terms and 
provisions in addition to the insuring clause: 
"1 .... . "EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE" 
2 .... . 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims. or 
other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or 
agreed to by the insured claimant; (b) not known to 
the company and not shown by the public records but 
!mown to the insured claimant either at Date of Policy 
or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or 
interest insured by this policy or acquired the 
insured mortgage and not disclosed in writing bv the 
insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such 
insured claimant became an insured hereunder; (c) 
resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; 
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(d) .attaching or created subsequent to Date of 
Polkcy (except as to the extent insurance is 
afforded herein as to any statutory lien for 
labor or material or to the extent insurance is 
afforded herein as to assess~ents for street 
improvements under construction or completed 
at Date of Policy)." (emphasis added) 
The testimony illicited from Gary Lyon, manager of 
the Respondent corporation merits careful attention on this 
point. This witness was no novice in the mortgage loan 
industry. He was affiliated with The Lockhart Company for 
13 years and served as the Vice President and Branch Manager 
of the Provo office. (TR 74, 75) He candidly admitted that 
the initial contact made with Respondent was for the purpose 
of securing a mortgage loan for a party by the name of Jerome 
Yeck; (TR 76-80) that a credit report and resume were obtained 
on Yeck; (D 15, 16) that property in West Jordan, Utah, 
comprising some 126 acres would be pledged as security for the 
loan; (TR 81, 82) that Yeck was buying the property and was 
"assumed" to be the owner of "fee title". (TR 80, 81, 82) 
The testimony of Mr. Lyon is as follows: 
"Q. And you were at that time considering making a loan 
to Mr. Jerome Yeck? 
A. That's correct." (TR 80) 
* * * * * * 
"Q. (By Mr. Wall) After you received the initial request 
for the loan for Mr. Yeck, did you in the interest of time or 
for any other reason undertake to secure any evidence of the 
ownership or title of the property that was to be involved in 
the transaction? 
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A. No, I did not. 
Q. Was there to be some security for the proposed loan? 
A. Yes, a first mortgage on the real estate in -- I 
think it's West Jordan." (TR 81) 
* * * * * * * 
"Q. (By Mr. Wall) Yes. Did he in effect or in substance 
tell you if you would make the loan that Mr. Yeck would give 
you a first mortgage and lien on this prQperty, the one hun-
dred and twenty some odd acres in West Jordan? 
A. He didn't tell me in so many words. It was just 
more or less presumed because he said he had the acreage and 
this was the man buying and I naturally assumed he had fee 
title to it. 
Q. This was the man that was buying it? 
A. Yes. Had fee title to it; that owned the property. 
Q. Did you at any time after that undertake to obtain 
any title evidence on this property that they had referred to? 
A. After we had rejected the loan then Mr. Harward came 
back and said, "If we restructure the situation and put it in 
a fee title or take the property into somebody else's name," 
would we go ahead with the transaction and I said, Yes, that 
would be feasible and then at that time he discussed with me 
about himself and I told him that there was no way because he 
had two loans with us at that time and his income would not 
justify him handling a payment on a twenty-five thousand dollar 
loan in that nature so then he mentioned about, "How about 
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Coul t and his father?" And we had had previous dealings with 
his father in Idaho Falls, and I said, yes, I felt that we 
could get financial statements and tax returns and so on; we 
would check them and see if we could possibly work it this way." 
(TR 82-83) 
Mr. Lyon further testified that he had been informed of 
the existance of a deed in favor of Deseret Distributing Com-
pany, a corporation known to be associated with Jerome Yeck, 
which pertained to the subject property (TR 82, 83, 84) and 
upon securing such information Mr. Lyon directed that said 
deed be delivered to Western States Title Insurance Company 
"to start the title work in it" or obtain a title policy. 
(TR 83, 84, 115) The following testimony of Mr. Lyon is 
relevant: 
"Q. Was there ever at any time when you went to the 
Western States Title Insurance Company and solicited a Title 
Insurance Committment from them that involved this piece of 
property? 
A. What do you mean? When was--
MR. BURT: Your Honor, I object. 
Q. (By Mr. Wall) Well, I am asking you if there ever 
was a time. 
A. That that happened? After the two applications had 
been approved and the appraisal on the real estate had been made, 
I talked to Mr. Harward and Mr. Coult and they said they had a 
deed that was in the name of Deseret Distributing Company and 
I told them, "Would you please take that to Western States 
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Title Company", and which Mr.. Coult did to obtain a title 
policy or connnittment for title policy· from Western States 
Title. 
Q. To answer my question, did you ever personally 
solicit a title report from Western States Title Insurance 
Company? 
A. I did not. They called me before the policy--
or before I had a chance to order the connnittment from them. 
Q. Did you ever talk to Mr. Lou Livingston? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. When did you talk to Mr. Livingston? 
A. Mr. Livinston talked to me--now, I'm not familiar 
on the dates right there but it was during this period of 
time Mr. Coult had brought in the Warranty Deed into Deseret 
Distributing Company and Lou Livingston said he had called the 
State Capitol and checked the validity of the corporation and 
found the corporation had not paid its corporation tax and 
was not a corporation in good standing at thci.t time and that 
he had found that Jerome Yeck was a director of that corporation 
and he was not interested in insuring that property and to the 
effect that the deed was not valid or that the property transfer 
was not valid, he just did not care to have any business trans-
actions with Mr. Jerome Yeck. 
Q. Now, this was what Mr. Livingston told you? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And, here aga~n. can you tell me in the time frame 
when that conversation occurred? 
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A. I would say that time frame was the last part of 
May and first part of June. 
Q. At that point in time had you seen or requested a 
committment for title insurance from Commonwealth Title Insu-
rance Company? 
A. No, I had not. 
Q. When he told you that they would not insure the 
title because of Mr. Yeck's involvement-- I think you indicated 
that was part of the reason? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you make any effort to explore why? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Coult or Mr. Harward that the title 
was uninsurable because of Yeck's involvement? 
A. Yes, I did. I called 
Q. Who did you tell? 
A. I think it was Mr. Harward. 
Q. How did you convey that information to him? 
A. Over the telephone. 
Q. And would that have been at or about the date that 
you had your conversation with Mr. Livinston in late May? 
A. It would have been the same date." 
(TR 83-85) 
Following the rejection by Western States Title Insurance 
Company of the request for title insurance, Mr. Lyon received 
a committment for title insurance (Ex P-5) issued by the 
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Appellant, (TR 86) and thereafter during mid June, 1975, 
Respondent concluded a mortgage loan transaction with the 
defendants Coult and Harward. Promissory Notes and Deeds of 
Trust were executed and recorded (TR 95, 98) (Ex. P-1, 2, 3, 4) 
following which policies of title insurance were issued by 
Appellant and delivered to Respondent. (Ex P-6, P-7) 
The Respondent never gave Appellant any written notice, 
as required by the terms of the policies of title insurance 
and committmen4 of Jerome Yeck, Deseret Distributing Company, 
or the rejection of title insurance by Western States Title 
Insurance Company or the manner in which the title of the 
subject property had been manipulated to circumvent recordation 
of a known and existing deed in favor of a corporation known 
to be directly involved with Jerome Yeck. (TR 88, 133) A 
portion of the testimony of Mr. Lyon highlights this point: 
"Q. Now, did you ever pursue that telephone conversation 
by giving any written notice to Commonwealth Land Title Insu-
rance Company of the interest of Mr. Yeck or his company that 
you have just related to the Court? 
A. No, I did not. I didn't see any reason to. 
(TR 87, 88) 
• 
Other significant testimony was illicited from the 
witness Delmar Rowley, manager of the Provo office of Western 
States Title Insurance Company. This party testified that he 
was a long time acquaintance of Gary Lyon; that he had several 
discussions with Mr. Lyon concerning the subject litigation and 
that Mr. Lyon had previously informed him that the Salt Lake 
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office of Western States Title Insurance Company had declined 
to write title insurance on the property in question-because 
of the parties involved and in particular a party by the name 
of Yeck; that he had told the other loan applicants that if 
they could get another company to write the title insurance, 
the loan could be made, and that Western States Title Insurance 
Company wanted nothing to do with the request for title in-
surance as long as Mr. Yeck was involved. (TR 48-52) The 
Respondent did not refute this testimony. 
In light of this compelling evidence and testimony, 
it is incredible that the trial court would adopt Finding of 
Fact "No. 10". 
A comment made by the court in the course of the trial 
is of interest. During the questioning of the witness Gary Lyon, 
the follo.wing questions, answers, and colloquy occurred: 
"Q. You were aware of the fact that there was a deed 
where, had it been recorded, it would have reflected the interest 
of this Deseret Company, whatever the name was? 
A. Thats correct. 
Q. And that Yeck was an agent or a principal of that 
corporation, right? 
A. Yes, I was aware that there was a deed. 
Q. And how did you propose to circumvent that deed so 
that that deed would not go of record and then result in a 
new deed issuing to someone else? 
A. Well, the --when we discussed the -- deed that had 
not been recorded, Mr. Harward said, well, that Mr. Bush was in 
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Ogden, and that it would be very simple to get a new deed and 
so instead of going into this corporation that Mr. Bush would 
just go ahead and deed straight through to the new principals 
on the new property. 
Q. Was there any discussion about how you would get the 
interest of this Deseret Company out of the title? 
A. No, there was not. 
Q. But you were aware of the fact that that deed existed 
showing that that company with Yeck as a party was in exis-
tance? 
MR. HOWE: You Honor, I'm going to object. There is no 
foundation for the deed and Mr. Yeck being tied together. None 
whatsoever. 
MR. BRANT WALL: He has testified that he knew the 
corporation and Mr. Yeck were in on it together. 
MR. HOWE: He testified he knew of a deed of the coupe-
ration or not a deed from Mr. Yeck or Mr, Yeck's involvement 
with the corporation. 
THE COURT: I understood him to testify in checking the 
Secretary of State's office -- did you check? 
THE WITNESS: I didn't check with it. Mr. Livingston did. 
MR. BRANT WALL: You were advised by Mr. Livingston, I 
think you said, that that's what he had learned. 
THE COURT: This is prior to this? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Well, then he had some awareness of the 
fact Mr. Yeck was involved with that corporation and as a 
member of the Board of Directors as I recall you saying. 
THE WITNESS: That's what he said." 
(TR 89-90) 
To further highlight the obvious erroneous finding, it 
is important to note the language of Conclusion of Law No. "2" 
which reads: 
"2. The third party plaintiff's knowledge of Jerome 
Yeck did not constitute a defect or other matter which would 
preclude third party plaintiff's recovery under the policies." 
The Findings and Conclusions seem totally incongruous. 
In the Findings of Fact, the Court says that Respondent had 
no knowledge of any defect, lien,encumbranc~ adverse claim or 
other matter affecting the title, and then concludes that 
knowledge did exist of Jerome Yeck. 
The record is replete with the testimony of Respondent's 
own manager conclusively establishing that there existed 
documents and other matters which precluded the procurement of 
title insurance from the title insurance company which Respon-
dent regularly conducted business with, and that a known deed 
in favor of Deseret Distributing Company had intentionally been 
kept off the record, and that Respondent did not, at any time, 
inform the Appellant in writing of the known asserted claims 
and interests of Jerome Yeck and Deseret Distributing Company. 
(TR 82, 83, 84, 85, 89, 91, 108, llS) (Ex. P-22) 
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In line with all of the foregoing evidence and testi-
mony, the Finding of Fact No. "10" adopted by the Court finds 
no support, and as stated in the case of Continental Bank & 
Trust Company v. Stewart, 4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P2d 890, the 
Court observed that "where certain testimony standing alone 
might be sufficient to support a finding, it must always be 
appraised in the light of all attendant circumstances and 
countervailing testimony. If when so viewed, it appears so 
clearly and palpably unreasonable that no fact trier acting 
fairly and reasonably could accept it, then it must be rejected 
as a matter of law, and the fact determined otherwise ... " 
It should also be noted that many courts view with 
disfavor the Findings prepared and adopted verbatim by one side, 
and as the Supreme Court of the United States observed in the 
case of United States v. Marine Ban-Corporation, Inc., (1974) 
418 U.S. 602, 41 Led 2d 978, 945 ST 2856, at footnote 13: 
"In adopting verbatim proposed Findings of Fact 
in a complicated Section 7 antitrust action, the 
District Court failed to heed this Court's 
admonition voiced a decade ago." (Citing 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas, op. cite.) 
In the case of Prosser v. Schmidt, 262 P2d 272 (Colo 
1953) the Supreme Court of that jurisdiction noted an oft 
repeated rule as follows: 
"Ordinarily we are slow to disturb a judgment 
entered upon the fact findings made by a 
court or jury on conflicting evidence; however, 
in cases where there is no serious conflict 
in the evidence and the trial court makes 
erroneous application of the law to the 
facts in hand, we do not hesitate to reverse 
the judgment, especially on questions of 
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law in the case made abundantly clear and 
decided in the same litigation between the 
same parties when the cause was formerly 
before this court." (See Mehlbrandt v. 
Hall, 213 P2d 605) 
In the light of all credible evidence and testimony, 
as reflected by the total record on appeal, we respectfully 
submit that the trial court misconceived the law applicable 
to the facts herein involved and thus committed reversable 
error. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT CONCEALED OR MISREPRESENTED FACTS WHICH 
IT KNEW WOULD INFLUENCE THE RISK OF ISSUING THE POLICIES OF 
TITLE INSURANCE AND WOULD INFLUENCE INSURER' S JUDGMENT IN 
MAKING THE CONTRACTS, HENCE, RESPONDENT'S CLAIMS ARE EXCLUDED 
FROM COVERAGE. 
The evidence presented had shown that a concealment of 
material facts was carried on by several of the parties, in-
cluding the Coults, the Harwards, and The Lockhart Company 
and it's various agents involved in the transactions. Does 
this concealment then preclude the insured from obtaining the 
relief claimed? The conclusion from the authorities cited 
below is that the insured may not recover. In 31-19-8 U.C.A. 
(1953) it states, in part: 
"(1) All statements and descripti~ns in any . 
application for an insurance pollcy or annulty 
contract 0r for the reinstatement or renewal 
thereof, 'by or in behalf of the insured or 
annuitant, shall be deemed to be represe~ta­
tions and not warranties. Misrepresen~atlons, 
ommissions, concealment of facts and ln-
correct statements shall not prevent a re-
covery under the policy or contract unless: 
(a) fraudulent; or (b) material either to the acceptance of 
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the risk, or to the hazard assumed by 
the insurer; or 
(c) the insurer in good faith either 
would not have issuP.d, reinstated or 
renewed it at the same premium rate, 
or would not have issued, reinstated 
or renewed a policy or contract in as 
large an amount, or would not have 
provided coverage with respect to the 
hazard resulting in the loss, if the 
true facts had been made known to the' 
insurer as required either by the 
application for the policy or contract 
or otherwise." 
It is apparent that under the facts presented, the 
Appellant should be exempted from liability under all three 
of these provisions. 
This Court has been confronted with similar issues on 
a number of occasions. In the case of Theros v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, 407 P2d 685· (Utah 1965), all of the 
facts in an application for life insurance had been provided 
to the company agent but recorded falsely and the insurance 
applicant then signed the application which application con-
tained the false statements. The Court ruled, in part, as 
follows at pages 687-688: 
"In order to defeat recovery on an insurance policy 
because of misrepresentation in the application, 
the misrepresentations must have been made with 
an intent to deceive and defraud the insurance 
company. However, such an intent may be inferred 
where the applicant knowingly misrepresents facts 
which he knows would influence the insurer in 
accepting or rejecting the risk. The same rule 
should a 1 where the a licant knowin lv or 
with constructive knowle ge, permits such mis-
re resentations to be submitted to the insurance 
company. Emphasis added 
A similar ruling was handed dow~ in the case of Page v. 
Utah Home Fire Insurance Company, 391 P2d 290 (Utah 1964), 
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wherein the Court stated at page 292 that: 
of facts 
See also the cases of Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company 
of America, 395 P2d 724, (Utah 1964); Farrington v. Granite 
State Fire Insurance Company, 232 P2d 754 (Utah 1951). 
It is the general rule in most, if not all, jurisdictions 
that the " ... insurer may avoid liability on a policy of title 
insurance where the policy was obtained through the fraud of 
insured, or the policy may be avoided where, in violation of 
a provision in the policy, insured has made an innocent mis-
representation of a fact material to the risk, or had inten-
tionally concealed or suppressed such fact .... " 45 CJS, In-
surance, Section 665, p 596. (See CJS for numerous cases there-
under for support of said position.) Th~s we see that the Utah 
statutory provisions and the Utah cases are in agreement with 
the great weight of authority on the matter. 
With regard to the intent of the insured to deceive the 
insurer the Courts have held that "there is a presumption of 
intent to deceive from the knowing concealment of material 
facts unless such presumtion is overthrown by substantial 
evidence. **"~< The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove lack 
of an intent to deceive on the part of the insured." Castagno v. 
Occidental Life Insurance Company, 151 F. Supp. 781, at 783 
(Utah 1973). 
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It is also the general rule that conditions set forth 
in a policy are not per se violative of the basic nature of 
title insurance and it is the general rule that parties to 
an insurance policy are free to define what losses or encum-
brances they intend to cover. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., 
v. Research Loan ~nd Investment Corp., 361 F2d 764, at 768 
(1966). From the facts presented in this action it seems 
apparent that the limitations set forth in the policies 
involved in this action exclude Respondent's claims from 
coverage. However, it should be kept in mind that this rule 
notwithstanding and absent any exclusionary provision in the 
policy, the above cited provision of the code should provide 
full protection to the Appellant for incidents such as are 
involved herein. 
T 
It has been stated that "Title insurance is no different 
from any other type of non-marine insurance, and, as such, is 
governed by the same general rules and principles applicable 
to issuance, validity and interpretation of policies of 
insurance generally." Weir v. City Title Insurance Company, 
125 N.J. Super. 23, at 29, 308 A2d 357 (1973). See this cas·e 
for a listing of additional decisions so holding.) 
It is also the continuing responsibility and duty of 
the claimant and applicant to divulge " ... newly discovered 
matters arising between the application for, and confirmation 
of, the contract where they come to the applicant's knowledge 
and render his former answers no longer true." Id. 
From the evidence it is clear that there was a conceal-
ment and to a degree and in manner misrepresentation of facts. 
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The insured knew that Yeck had and claimed a lien and interest 
in the subject property and it was their duty to dtsclose this 
information to the insurer. It is the insurer's duty to search 
the records for Judgments, liens, etc., on a named individual 
to protect their interests and those.of the claimant and to 
accomplish this goal it ~s mandatory that the claimant provide 
all pertinent information to the insurer. In the case of ' 
Apolskis v. Concord Life Insurance Company, 445 F2d 31, the 
Court stated that an applicant has a duty to act in good faith 
toward his potential insurer in an attempt to make a full and 
complete disclosure of all relevant information and that the 
claimant or applicant must not judge the materiality of the 
information on his own, but that he must submit all information 
to the insurance company and then let the company decide on 
the materiality. 
In the case of Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York 
v. Middlemiss, 135 P2d 275, 103 Utah 429, issues bearing upon 
the critical point involved herein, that is, failure to dis-
close facts which would naturally influence the insurer's judg-
ment in making an insurance contract, were involved. The 
Court there stated, with regard to the issue of materiality: 
"A material representation is one w~ich ordir;a:ily 
would influence a prudent insurer ~n determ~n~ng 
whether to accept or reject a risk, or in fixing 
the amount of premium in the event of such accep-
tance or in excepting some risk or part thereof 
from coverage." 
The Court then citing Zolintakis v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Society, 10 Cir., 97 F2d 583 at 586, went on to set 
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forth the recognized rule as follows: 
"A misrepresentation will not constitute a 
defense to an action on a policy of in-
surance unless it was intentionally untrue 
or was made with a reckless disregard for 
its truth or falsity. Where an insured 
knowingly makes a material misrepresen-
tation, proof of an actual, conscious pur-
pose to deceive is not necessary. 
See also Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. 
Colorado Leasing, Min. & Mill. Co., 116 P 154; Charlton v. 
Wakimoto, 216 P2d 370; Pelican v. Mutual Life Ins. Go. of 
New York, 119 P 778; Telford v. New York Life Insurance Co. , 
69 P2d 835; Temperance Ins. Exchange v. Coburn, et al, 379 
P2d 653; All American Life & Casualty Co. v. Krenzelok, 409 
P2d 766. 
The Respondent thus had a duty to disclose all information! 
concerning the title to the property in question and failed to I 
,( so do. This failure constituted the withholding and concealment 
of material facts which, if known by the Appellant, would have 
enabled the Appellant to exercise a most valuable perogative, i.e 
a determination of whether or not it was willing to assume the 
risks in light of all attendant circumstances. 
The testimony on this point clearly indicates that had 
all matters been revealed, including particularly the involve-
ment of Jerome Yeck and/or his corporation, the Appellant would 
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not only have scrutinized the application carefully, bu~ 
"''fh } 
woul!d not have issued the policies of insurance involved ~reu.;, ·1'~ 
(TR Vol. II 15, 16, 64) .. -·~ 
:.~'~:! 
POINT III 
THE RESPONDENT BY ITS CONDUCT AND KNOWLEDGE, CREATE», 
SUFFERED, ASSUMED OR AGREED TO K:CEPT THE RISK COMPLAINED OF, 
AND PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH /13 OF THE EX-
CLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE OF THE COMMITTMENT TO INSURE AND POLI-
CIES OF INSURANCE, THE CLAIMS OF THE RESPONDENT ARE EXCLUDED 
FROM COVERAGE 
Paragraph ff3 of the "Exclusions from Coverage" provisions 
of the committment to insure and the title insurance policies 
(Ex. P-5, P-6, P-7) provide that if the insured creates, 
suffers, assumes or agrees to defects, liens, encumbrances, 
adverse claims, or other matters, which are not known to the 
insurer and not shown by the public records but known to the 
insured claimant either at Date of Policy or at the date such 
claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by the policy 
of insurance, or acquired the insured mortgage and not disclosed 
in writing by the insured to the insurer prior to the date the 
insured claimant became insured, such matters are expressly 
excluded from coverage. 
The testimony of Respondents own manager, supra, stands 
as a total indictment of the Respondent on these issues. It 
appears conclusive from said testimony that the Respondent was 
willing to assume full responsibility for all consequences which 
might flow from the intentional concealment of the facts not 
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revealed to Appellant. 
The compelling conclusion which must be drawn from the 
total evidence and testimony is that the_ Respondent was put 
on notice by the title insurance company which it regularly 
conducted it's business with (Western States Title Insurance 
Company) that title insurance could not be obtained if Jerome 
Yeck was involved in any manner with the title to the property 
to be insured. It is interesting to note that after the loan 
application had been restructured to circumvent Jerome Yeck 
and or Deseret Distributing Company and the existing unrecor-
ded deed to Deseret Distributing Company, Respondent made no 
further attempt to secure title insurance from Western States 
Title Insurance Company, but rather saw fit to quietly sit by 
and allow another company (Appellant) to issue its committment 
to insure and policies of title insurance totally unaware of 
the risks, which if known to the Appellant would have un-
doubtedly resulted in said policies being denied. 
Respondent has its judgments against the makers of the 
~ 
original notes and should be left with its recourse against 
them for the recovery of its loss, if any. To conclude othe~~ 
~nse violates every sound legal doctrine and equitable principal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent was the co-architect of this entire transactioo 
The Conclusions of Law are clearly irreconcilable and contrary 
to the significant Findings of Fact, and such Findings of Fact 
are clearly without support in the Record. 
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Respondents failure to adhere to requirements and pro-
visions of the committment to insure and the policies of insu-
ranee should exclude Respondents claims from coverage. 
The Respondent, having assumed the consequences of its 
own design by concealing known facts which it knew would influ-
ence the judgment of the Appellant in issuing committments to 
insure o.r policies of title insurance, should now look to the 
parties who acted in concert with it for such relief as may 
be available. 
We respectfully submit that the Judgment of the lower 
court should be reversed. 
Respectfully, 
BRANT H. HALL 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were delivered to Gary R. Howe and W. Clark 
Burt, of Callister, Greene & Nebeker, 800 Kennecott Building, 
'7 Salt Lake City, Utah, 84113, this~~ day of June, 1978. 
,, 
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